University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1973

Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions,
October Term 1971
Theodore J. St. Antoine

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/318

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971."
In Labor Relations Yearbook--1972. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1973.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

~bor Relations Yearbook-1972
Chronology of Events
Collective Bargaining
Labor Relations Conferences
Labor Organizations
Role of Federal Government
Economic Data

Prepared by
BNA Editorial Staff

PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., WASHINGTON, D.'C.

Copyright © 1973
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
Washington, D. C. 20037

Printed in The United States of America
International Standard Book Number: 0-87179-044-0
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-19726

LABOR RELATIONS CONFERENCES AND STUDIES

Another measure that wiU get priority will be a national health insurance bill. Hearings were held on these
measures during the first session of
the 92nd Congress, and the choice
then appeared between the GriffithKennedy bill, with its initial cost of
$57 !billion, and the more modest Administration bill, which would work
through ,private health plans.
With all the hearings that have
been held in the House and Senate,
chances are good that there will be
legislation affecting priva.te pension
plans in the 93rd Congress. During the
92nd Congress, the Administration
adhered to ibl view that the legislation should be limited to additional
fiduciary responsibilities for plan administrators. But it finally lndlca.ted
it would go for a formula providing
for 50 percent vesting of benefits
after a combination of 50 years of
serVice and age. The Javits, Williams,
and Dent bllls, however, go way beyond the Administration proposal m
the areas of funding, vesting, and reinsurance.
FOR THE FUTURE
Problems that are becoming acute
in labor-management rel9itlons may
lead to some far-reaching proposals
in the near fut-ure. First, there is the
problem of case loads. The NLRB's
annual case intake is running over
40,000, that of the EEOC ls close to
33,000, and arbitrators are estimated
to !be handling over 50,000 labor arbitrations a year-and there ls a shortage of acceptable arbitrators. Then,
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there ls the problem of the relation".'
ship between the federal and the
state and local governments, with frequent suggestions that the federal
government assume jurisdiction over
all.
This has led to some elaborate proposals. • In his ABA address, Chairman
Miller suggested a system of labor
courts throughout the country, with
administrative law judges (formerly
trial examiners) handling the cases
and with Increased authority. (See 80
LRR 352 for text of speech.)
• Then there ls the Griffin bill to
estaiblish a United States Labor Court
to handle unfair-labor-practice cases
and the Tower Bill to transfer jurisdiction over unfair-labor-practice
cases to the federal district court.s.
Moreover, there are the proposals of
the blue ribbon panel of lawyers that
would completely revise our lbaslc labor law.
• Finally, ,there is the proposal to
eliminate the procedural fm.gmenitatlon that charac,terizes admi:n,istratlon
of federa!I. labor law. Thds is the idea
of Professor Charles J. !Morris of
Southern Methodast IUniversilty Law
School. He would establlish a United
States Labor Courtt with jurisdiction
over the Taft-Hartley A.cit, the Ra.llviay Labor Act, and Title vm: of the
Civtll Rights Act, and possibly oll:lher
s taitutes. He also would me.rge representation and mediation functions.
With all the new laws and new
proposals, there is much to think
about.
1

Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term, 1971
Following is the text of an address
by Theodore J. St. Antoine, Dean and
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, to the annual meeting of the American Bar Association's
Sect"ion of Labor Relations Law held
in San Francisco, August 12-15, 1972.
Full title of the address is "Judicial
Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971."

I. Introduction
Labor law, like most other law in
the making, is intensely political at

its m a r g i n s. On certain central
themes, such as the right to join a
union and freedom of contract, judges
and administrators of widely varying
outlooks may be able to reach a consensus. But along the frontiers of the
law, no such accord can be expected.
Conscientious decision-makers will inevitably differ with one another, depending on their diverse social values.
They may even differ with their own
prior positions, depending on shifts in
the political climate. Moreover, if the
decision-makers happen to be justices
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_of the United States Supreme Court,
that most institutional of judicial
bodies, they cannot help but be differently influenced from time to time by
the changing interaction among the
Court's changing membership.
In the labor field, as elsewhere, a
hallmark of the Warren Court was a
bold inventiveness, even at the risk of
some damage to the original congressional (or constitutional) design: A
hallmark of the Burger Court, it be..
comes increasingly clear, is going to be
a resurgence of traditional lawyerly
skills and lawyerly cautiousness ;:..._
even at the risk of some stunting, of
the growth of creative legal theory.
All these characteristics are exhibit!,ld in the Supreme Court's labor law
decisions of. the past year, especially
in the three I consider the most sign,lficant. Those are NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,1 de,al:.
lng with the obligations of "successor"
employers; Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
CQ., 2 dealing with the scope of . mandatory barga,Ining subjects; and Centtal lla:rdware Co. v. NLRB,s dealing
with the right of a union to solicit
e~ployee~. on company parking lots.

II. ,,Burns, cind Successorship
Corporate ·mergers ·and· acquisitions
have become an American way of
business.4 Their increasing frequency
undersc<>res the practical importanc!:l
of the Supreme Court's efforts in the
Burns case to spell out the collective
bargaining obligations of a surviving
or "successor" employer. Yet ironically
the first, and perhaps the most critical, point to be made about Burns is
that it •hardly: repr.esents a typical
successorship situation, if indeed it
cap fairly be called a successorship
qase at all. ..· . · , ,
.
Wackenhut had a contract to provide protection services at a Lockheed
plank In March 1967 the United Plant
Guards were certified as the bargaining agent of the Wackenhut guards at
1400 u.s. 272, 92 a.ct.· 157,1, 80 LRaM 2225

(U.S. 1972).
2 404 U.S. 15'7, 78 IIRJR'M 2974 (19'111).
. s 407 u.s. 539, 92 a.ct. 2238, 80 I.dU!,M
2'189
(tr.S. t.972).
.,
· '4 The number of annu11.1 ooriporate mergers
and acquisitions more than doubled between

1961 and 1969, although there was a decline 1n
1970. 19'1'1 Sta.tistical · A,bstl,act ,Of the United

states 474.

Loekheett, 4intf ·in Ute >APllfi th'.e UPO
and Waekaihut entered, •m,ttii;a ·three;year 'colleeffire<· bargalilmt •ag'ieement.
Meanwhlle; Loekheed, sdllfiltea. bids for
a·'new guard contract;ft6'begin July 1.
iAt a; pre ... bfd .co~~nee• attended by
Burns aniong others; Lockheed informed• the bidders Of 'the UPG's certification and cif it.Ii. contt-a.ct with
Wackenhut. Both , Wackenhut and
Burns submitted $1tlmates;xand Lockheed ,.accepted Burns' ,bid' at the end
of May. Burns retainec:f, ,27 of . the
.Wackenhut guards; and brought 1n 15
·of U;s own guards from elsewhere. At
the same time, Burns informed the
former Wackenhut employees that
they would have to join 'the Am.erlcan
Federation of Gttartul, another union
having contracts with Burns at other
locations. .On June .29, Burns recognized the AFG as the bargaining rep:..
resenta.tive. On Ju,ly 12, however, the
lJl>G demanded ijlat Burns recognize
it and honor the collectiv:e J:)argaining
agreement between the UPG and
Wackenhut. When.Burns refused, the
UPG filed unfair labor p r a c ti c e
charges.
The National Labor Relations Board
found Burns had violated §:,8(a) (2) of
the National Labor Relations Act by
unlawfully• assisting and recognizing
the AFG, and this routme finding was
not thereafter . contested by Burns.
Next the Board, relying on a long line
of cases II holding that a mere change
of employers or of ownership does not
affect a certification if a majority of
the employees of ·the first employer
are retained by the new management,
ruled that Burns had violated § 8(a)
(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the UPG. Then, in a reversal
of a considerable body of precedent,G
the Board went on to hold that
Burns, as the "successor" employer in
the ~ockheed guard unit, was bound
by the.. substantive terms of the
collective ,agreement between the
"predecessor" employer,. Wackenhut,
5 See, e.g., Soll.th Oarol1na Granite Co., 58
NLRB 1448, 15 t.a:RM 1,22 (•1944), enforced sub
nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc .• 152 F.2d
25, 1''7 LRBM 683 (4th Cir. 1945); NLRB v.
Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 P.2d 9'21, 56
lJBJRM 2097 (6th Olr. 1964).
6 See, e.g., Matter of ILWU (J'llnea.u S-pruce),
82 NII.RB 650, 23 LRJRM 15S7 (11949). enforced,
189 F.2d 1'17, 28 LBBM 2064 (9th Cir. 195'1),
aff'd on other grounds, 34'2 U.S. 237, 29
LR.BM 2244J (19512); Rioh11k, loo., 145 NLBB
1-236, 1242 n. 15, 55 LRiBlM 1130 (1!164).
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and the UPG, and that Burns' failure
to 'honor" the contract was likewise
a violation of§ 8(a) (5).
In an opinion. by Justice White, the
Supreme Court sustained (5-4) the
Board's· view that Bums had to recognize and bargain with the UPG, but
rejected (9-0) the notion that Burns
also had to assume the Wackenhut
contract. On the duty to bargain,
Justice White emphasized that a "majority 1 of these employees" who had
voted "a few months before" for the
union had been hired by Burns for
work in an "identical unit." He observed that it would be a "wholly different case" if (1) Burns' operational
structure and practices differed from
those of Wackenhut, so as to make
the L o c k h e e d bargaining unit ~
longer appropriate, or (2) Burns had,
without any unlawful discrimination,
hired employees not already represented by a certified union. It was
noted that both .Burns and Wackenhut were nationwide organizations,
performing identical services at the
same facility. Only the supervisory
personnel were different. Beyond this,
Justice White seemed content to rely
upon lower court precedent to justify
a bargaining order in. favor of an
"incumbent''. union "where · the bargaining unit remains unchaJ;).ged. and
a majority s of the empl9yees .hired
by the new employer are· represented
by a newly c e r ti f i e d bargaining
agent."
·
In denying the UPG's contract
claims, Justice White laid primary
emphasis on the congressional policy
of promoting the bargaining freedom
of employers and unions.11 He also
argued that holding either union or
employer to the substantive terms of
an old collective agreement could re7 406 U.S. 2112, 92 S.Ot. at 1577, 80 LRRM
2225. rt Is unclear whether Justice White
considers the crltlieal "maJ<>rity" to be ('1)
a majority of the ;predecessor's employee& going into the successor's work force, or (2) a
m,aJorlty of the successor's work force com•
ing from the predecesaor employer, or (3)
both. NLRB co u n s e l apparently thought
ne1'ther majority . WILS eSBentl&l ("a ··substan•
tt.al number [of the predecessor's employees]
. . . enough to glve you a oontlnuity··ot employment conditions ln the bargalnlng Unit").
although in Burns both ma.Jorlties seem to
b.a.ve ·been .i,resent;
8 406 U.S. 272, 92 S.Ot. a.t 1579, 80 IJR.BM
2225. OOntmst the use of the term "ma.Jority"
here with that ln the text, supra, at

note 7.

9 See, e.g., H. X. Porter Co.
U.S. 99, 73 LBaM: 2581 (1970). -

v. NLBB, ~7
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sult in serious inequities. A potential
buyer, for example, might be willing
to take over a moribund business only
if he could make substantial changes
in employment practices. Burns, it
was stressed, did not consent to be
co.vered by the Wackenhut contract.
CONFLICT WITH wn,EY

Justice White's analysis obviously
raises the possibility of a conflict with
the Court's earlier decision in John
Wiley & · Sons, • Inc. v. Livingston.10
There the surviving employer in · a
two-party merger was ordered to arbitrate the extent to which it was
bound by a collective -bargaining
agreement negotiated by a union and
the predecessor employer that had
disappeared in the merger. Justice
White listed several reasons for distinguishing Wiley & Sons from Burns,
most of which seem far from convincing. Wiley, he said, involved a § 301
suit to compel arbitration, not an unfair labor practice proceeding like
Burns. But in recent years the Supreme Court has been willing to sanction the Board's increasing interven,..
tion into the area of contract enforcement under the rubric of remedying
refusals to .bargain. Thus, in NLRB v.
Strong,H the Supreme Court approved a Board• •order requiring an
employer to sign and' acknowledge a
labor .co n t r a ct negotiated on. his
behalf by a ,multiemployer association~ and to pay :fringe benefits to union trust funds · in accordance with
the terms, of the agreement. The Supreme Court, in my opinion, should
properly keep the,. NLRB out. of ·the
business of· adjudicating individual
contract claims under collective bargaining agreements, consigning them
instead to the courts or arbitrators.12
At the same time the Court is apparently quite prepared, 1n: appropriate
circumstances, to let the Board exercise concurrent jurisdiction· with•
courts and arbitrators when the issue
raised goes to the very existence of a
1 o 376 U.S. 5413, 55 LRR'.M 2769 (1984) .
11393 U.S. :wt, 70 IJifiRM 2100 (1969)·. See
also NIJRB v. O&O Pl:VWOOd 0oll)q 385 U.S.
421, 64 LBBi¥ 2065 (,1967).
12 See,· e.g., ·NLB,13 v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357,
360, 70 IJEtRl4 2100 f1969); &t. Antoin~ '.'A
Touchstone for Laibor :Qoa,rd Bemedles, • 14
Wayne L. Rev. 1039, 1050-,52 (·1988). Of. Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150, '17 URRM
1931 (1971).
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contract or its applicability to a particular employer.
In addition to emphasizing that
Wiley was a § 301 case and not an un:..
fair labor practice proceeding, Justice
White declared that Wiley dealt directly only with the duty to arbitrate, and not with the ultimate
question of whether the surviving
company was bound by any substantive terms of the pre-existing contract. That is correct. But surely it
would have been anomalous to require
arbitration in Wiley unless the Court
was ready to entertain the possibility
that the arbitrator might render an
enforceable substantive award. Despite Justice White's veiled suggestions to the contrary, therefore, I do
not think the result in Burns would
have been different if the case had
reached the Supreme Court as a § 301
suit, either to secure arbitration or to
enforce an arbitral award.
A further, rather curious, comment
is made that Wiley occurred against a
background of state law embodying
the rule that the surviving corporation in a merger is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation. I should have thought that Lincoln Mills 13 and its progeny had long
since made federal law controlling to
the exclusion of state law in the determination of rights. and obligations
under labor contracts. Perhaps Justice White meant that state· law can
be helpful in ascertaining the parties'
intent and their actual or constructive agreements. For after the reference to state law he immediately
proceeded to what I consider the most
solid basis for distinguishing Wiley
from Burns: "Here there was no
merger, no sale of assets, no dealings
whatsoever .between Wackenhut and
Burns. On the contrary, they were
coml)etitors for the same work.... " 14
Justice.. Wbite then concluded that the
mere hiring of Wackenhut .employees
was a "wholly insufffoient basis · for
implying either in fact or in law that
Burns had agreed or must be held
to have agreed to honor Wackenhut's
collective-bargaining contract."
In a final portion of its o_oinion, the
Court held, again unanimously, that
18

Textne Workers Union v. Lincoln Mllls,

353 U.S. 448, 40 LR.RM 21'13 ( 1957).
a4t.
406 U.S. 272, 92: S.Ct. a.t 1581,

80 LRBM

,re..

Burns did :rfot ,-have to
burse its
employees on the 'tlieory: it had, unilaterally changed tne :terms of the' old
wacke:iihut contract without bargaining with the. United .Plant Guards.llS
The NLRB's long-standing general
rule 16 has been that whether or not
a successor e:rrtployet is boUI?,d by its
predecessor's contract, it must:'not institute terms of employment·· different from those !Ii that contract without first bargainiIIg with the employee's representative. In this respect the
successor emplo;ver would be in the
same position as employers generally
during the period between collective
bargaining agreements.· Justice White
was prepared to concede that when
a new employer plans to retain all
the employees in a unit, he should
"consult" with the employees' union
before he fixes the terms of employment.11 But Justice White went on to
say that in other situations it may
not be clear until the successor has
hired his full complement of employees that he has a duty to bargain
with the union as a majority representative. Un de r this reasoning,
Burns' obligation to barl!'ain did not
mature until it had selected its foree
of guards late "in June. It was thus
free to set the initial terms on which
it would hire its employees. ·
VIEWS OF DISSENTERS

Justice Rehnquist, joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice Brennan, and
Justice Powell, dissented from the
majority's conclusion that Burns was
under a statutory obli~ation to' bargain with the UPG. First, he argued,
it was not mathematically demonstrable that a majority of Burns• 42
employees wanted the UPG as their
bargaining representative. There was
no evidence even as to the individual
sentiments of the 27 employees com11 After the Supreme Oourt rendered its
Judgment in Burna, a. "dispute arose as to
whether .thls issue was even praperly before
the Court.
16 See, e.g., OVernlte TrallSP<>rtation Oo.,
157 NLRB 1185, 61 LB.RM: 1520 (1966), enforced, 3'1'2 F'.2d 765, 64 LR.RM 2359 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838, JJ6 LR.RM
2307 ( 1967).
1 7 Burns he.s since been interpreted by the
NLRB a.s authorizing the finding of an 8(a)
(5) violation when a. suecessor employer that
has retained all the unit employees unilaterally changes the terms in the -predeeessor's
contra.et Without prior bargaining With the
Incumbent union. Howard Johnson Co., 198
NLRB No. 98, 80 LB.RM 1769 (1972).
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ing from Wackenhut, let alone of the
15 remaining employees of Burns.

Justice Rehnquist further criticized
the Board for automatically accepting
Wackenhut's unit at Lockheed as appropriate for Burns, especially in the
face of evidence that Burns regularly
transferred employees from job to job,
and had never bargained with a union
consisting of employees at a single location. On both the questions of majority representation and appropriate
unit, Justice Rehnquist insisted that
the majority decision could be sustained, if at all, only by resort to the
doctrine of "successorship."
Thereupon, J us ti c e Rehnquist
launched a bristling attack on the
application of successorship doctrine
to the Burns situation. The concept
of successorship finds support, he
said, in the need to grant employees
some protection against a sudden
transforma,tiion in their employer's
business, which results in the substitution of a new legal entity but leaves
intact significant eleme:...1ts of the
former !business. There must be continuity in the enterprise, as well as
change, he maintained, and that continuity must ,be at least partially on
the emp,loyer's side, and not wholly
on the employees'. Burns, he pointed
out, had acquired no assets, tangible
or intangible, by negotiation or transfer from Wackenhut. It succeeded to
the Locklieed service contract over
Wackenhut's vigorous. opposition. In
short, in Justice Rehnquist's view,
Burns was not a successor of Wackenhut, and should not be subject to
Wackenhut's bargaining obligations
on the basis of the successorship
doctrine.
On the facts of Burns, Justice
Rehnquist's analysis seems the more
persuasive. Merely at the semantic
level-which is often helpful !because
of what it tells us about the reasonable expectations of interested parties-it is hard to avoid feeling that
"rival" or "competitor" is mqch more
apt than "successor" to describe the
relationship of Burns to Wacke.nhut.
More substantively, it would appear
that employees and their union
should be entitled, with regard to
either bargaining or contract rights,
to consider themselves protected only
against those changes in which their
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employer in some way participates.
He may participate actively by merging or :selling his business, or passively by !being declared bankrupt, but
at least there should be some involvement by the original entity with
which the union bargained or contracted. It was, after all, only his
statute, his prospects, his assets that
the .union could sensibly have relied
on. Moreover, both bar.gaining status
and labor contracts denote relationships; they have an employer quotient as well as a union-employee
quotient. To transfer rights and duties, a nexus would seem necessary at
the employer as well as the unionemployee end of the relationship. Allowing the bare movement of employees from one employer to another
to carry along either !bargaining or
contract rights and obligations ignores the employer side of the relationship.ls
Justice Rehnquist also assumes a
more logical stanee than the majority in Burns by deciding both the
bargaining issue and -the contraiet
issue the same way. Despite the considerable amount of Board precedent
to the contrary, I am satisfied that
in most of these successorship cases,
bargaining rights and contract rights
sho:uid stand together, or fall together. The same considerations of employee free ·choice, industrial stability,
flexibility of b~iness arrangements,
and so on, that militate f,or or
against the survival of !bargaining
rights also militate for or against the
survival of contrac't rights. Justice
Rehnquist's distaste for "unwarranted rigidity" in labor relations wm
probaibly lead him to •be chary about
the survival of rights in most cases.
If Justice White meant what he said
in stating that Burns turned on its
"precise facts," however, the door
has been left open for the Court to
distinguish Burns in some of the more
typical successorship situtions of sale
or inerge'r, and to find the predecessor's contract binding on a true successor.rn

18 A strong Mgument to the contrary 1s
presented In a most comprehensive and
thou~tful study of the successorshi1> problem by Professor Stephen B. Goldberg of nUnols, "The Labor Law Obllgations of A Successor E!nployer," 63 Nw. Univ. L. Bev. 735,

749-50, 805-06 (·1969).
19 The NLRB, with Uttle if any analysis, Is
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Even though Bu.ms and Wiley. are Pk!Yers . :a:i,ay , • l ' ~ ~ . :. ','. ;$~ng
reconclla;ble in theory, their a~ market .:,:COl.ldl. .11:;;:i,,
, ,qt•:., being
proaches are plainly divergent. Both str~j~c~~ .b, ~ ; ' f > ~ g or
Justice White and Justice Rehnqu~ co~!!;rMtual,obllg~~~~ ,m~ have
in Burns speak in terms that would ~ - ass~ ,by ~PJ'U~~ .predecessound :familiar In the mQUth of a tra- sqrs. , The fu.ture. ®VelQpment of
ditional Willist.onian-for example, successors};)fip . Ja'\lfl i undouptecny dethe .need for "coI11Sent" under "normal pe:nds far :QiP.~ on .tbe ;w,t,.tlle memcontraet principles," and the question pers of. the supr~e Court pltlmately
of whether certain rig.lits and duties balance op.t these, compe~_ values
were "'in fact" "assigned" or . "as- i;llan on any Jpglc~J. dedlliC/1'-lbns from.
'
sumed." Th:ls 1s far ery from the atti- Wiley and Bw-zia.
tude in Wiley. There the Court
s~ed thait "a oollective ·'ba.r,ga.ining : Ill. Pitttbvrgh Plate
the
agreement ls. not an ordinary conD~ ~ :flarg~in·· .
tra.et," but a "generalized code" setting forth "the common law of a
'l'he Supreme Coun onee more had
particula;r industry or of a particu- to .'.struggle .:with defl1ling the scope of
lar plant." 20 A predecessor's labor tlie duty to · bargli.{~ 1n , Ohemieal
contract, according to Wiley, could Workers Local 1 v., P1tits'b1Jr~ Plate
bind the su.ccessor employer where Glass. co:21 .A wiion an,d an ~:JD.ployer
there is "substantial .continuity of had a ,group health insurance plan
identity in the business ent.erprise," in.' which retir~~ ~Pl<>~~ · eould
without regard to the existence of Plitticipa.te. Whe,rt l\!edJ,~'.;'llVU enactual consent. Wiley thus bol¢lly re- acted, the tiJ11ol'i sought m'i~lfk.1:m barlied on the force of the federal labor g~µi.g to tenego~ate ~ lll$111"8.Dce
statut.es to impose contractual obli:.. ·J>ev,eftts fol', ret:lied ~n:tplo,W~. The
gations ·on an unconse~titig succes,.. ~~loyer df$p-g~a the.;);uµ~4,>s right
sor; in contrast, l:lurns refoct.UJ,ed at- tli bargain on behalf ot .the retirees.
t.entlon on common· 1aw notions of Eventu.ally, over the ufiloti.~s obJecindividual assent.
.
tio:Q.S, ~ . ,em1;>1oyer · wrote each reOn a st1ll deeper level Burns :i;eflects J;l~d ~mployee, offe~ ti!> P,aY a supa Clash ,between certain fundamental p1~~11ta1 Med'icare pteDµUJrt it the
values in the labor field. On the one ertipioyee would. witbdra,w .. 4°0Jn the
hand, there is a concern about ,pro- ntgotlated pl~. !.i\fl;er 16 ~{' i9b retecting employees against a sudcjen tirees ·el~ted to accept .ib.ts proposal,
and unforeseen loss of !bargaining the union fHed unfair labor practices
and contract rights. There .is also with the NLHB. The Board found the
a concern aibout maintajning indus- employer had refusec:l to bargafn and
trial st.~ •bi 1i t y and labor. peace, had unllate~lly changed terms of ~mthrough reducing the number of rep. plo,ment, contra.ry to § 8,(d) and
resentation elections and . su~ining i·sca) (5) of the NLRA. · · ".
the life of Ia;bor agreements. On the
Speaking through Justice Brennan,
other hand, stress is laid on the the Supreme Court held there was no
freedom and yoluntariness of the ool- violation of § 8(a)(5), rejecting all
I~ctlve bargainµlg process, on •the im- the various grounds for the Labor
portance .. of. ~81d4l,fPg . neitner un- Board's· decision. First, the Board had
ions nor e~plofers · wit!)., substantive ruled that the retirees were', themcontract ~rms ''to which they. have sel'Y'es "employees" within the meannot agi:~d. Stress. is fµrthe,r laid on ing of the Act, so ,that their benefits
:m."ovidtng,,,/ i;naximu~. ,· }lexibiliity in wei-e a "term and condition'' ·or their
business arrangements,, so. th11,it e~:: own employemerit. The Court dlsm ~ ihis view, stating that ,,ce)•s
apparently go1ng·· to · reatl Burns broadly ·for
definftion of "employee" 1s Hmited tothe propositlan that a successor employer 1s
not required to assume the contractual obl~"working" persons, and does not cov~ f .. the Predecessor. See, e.g., Howard
er •those' who have retired from the
l'76,9 (l1f/2)C:O••, 19' NLRB No. 98, 80 LRR,U
1/V()l'k force. M:():reover, the Cotirt rea· ~D";Jobn .Wiley & s6ns. Inc., v. Livlllgston
~ned. that the retirees did·nQt share
3711 U.S. 543, 550, 55 tRRM 27"9' (1964) q ~
l:nlt ln part frdm Unl~ed Steelworkers v. Wara community of interest wibh active
rtor & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578·

~ncf

79, .46 LRlW: 2416, 34 LA 561 (1960),

··

~1404 U.S. 157, 18

LB1RiM 2974

(!WIil).

-/-

{,
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workers. 'sttMtantial enough to justi-

:their inclusion in the bargaining
unit; even the Board denied them the
right to vote in representation elections.
Altematively, the Board had held
that the pensioners' benefits were a
mandat.ory:22 su,bject of bargaining
on the theory that they. "vitally"
affected the «terms and conditions of
employment" of •the active employees, principally by lnfluen-cing the
value of their current and future
benefits. In keeping with its precedents 1n the Oliver 23 and Fibreboard 24 cases, the Supreme court
agreed that there are occamonal ex~ons to the normal rule that
matters involving individuals outside
the employment relationship do not
fall within the category of mandat.ory lbargaining subjects under § 8
(d). The La'bor Board had correctly
stated -the «vttal effect" test for these
exceptions, but had wrongly applied
it. The Bupreme Court disagreed
with the !Board's assessment that the
retirees' benefits "vitally" affected
the active employees, concluding that
the advantage bo the latter of including retired employees under the same
health insur,ance contract was "speculative and insub&tantial •at ibest."
Lastly, the Oourt ruled that the
employer did not violate § 8(a) (lfi) by
offering the retirees an exchange
for their withdrawal from the already negotiated health insurance
plan. Even if the proposal constituted
a midterm "modification" of the contract within the meaning of § 8(d),
said the Court, it would have been
an unfa.ir labor practice only if it
changed a. term that was a mandatory rather than a permissive subject
of bargaining. This holding is obviously significant far beyond the area
of retirees' rights. In effeet, the
22 A "mandatory'' aubjeot ls one. on Which

fy

either pa.r:ty m&'f 1nalBt upon bargaining· as a
concUtkm of reaching agreement;· negotta.-

tlons can be ca.rr1ed. to the point of "1mp118118,"or deadlock, on sud1 a topic. A "perm111111ve"
sulbJect Is cne on which the pa.rtie& ma7 barpm U the7 both are willing, but neither
party can 11181st on barp.ining owr the

other's ~ectlon. See NLRB v. Wooster Div.
~ ~ ) ~ e r OOr,p., 368 U.S. 3G. 412 ~
23 Teamsters union v. Oliver, 358 US, 283;

43 LRoRM 2374 (1959) (rente.la or owner-opere.ted truclts).
.
24 Pibreboa4'd Pla.:Per .Products OOrp. v. NLBB:
3'19 U.S. 203. 117 L1\BM 2609 (,1964) (oontra.ot1ntr out).
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Court is saying that the parties to a
contra.et cannot convert a ;permissive
bargaining subject into a mandatory
subject, even for the term of the contract, by including it in their agreement. It is qui•te. understandable that
the 0ourt, in light of its past acceptance of the mandat.ory-permi&sive
dichotomy, would not let the parties
permanently reclassify a particular
topic. But it was surely not self-evident that the parties would be foreclosed from voluntarily subjecting
otherwise permissive matters t.o the
statut.ory duties of contract execution
and administration. Nonetheless, the
Court's reading is consistent with the
language of ~ 8(d), and with the
general congressional policy .of leaving contract enforcement to the
courts rather than the NLR!B.211 The
Court recognized, of course, that the
union in PittBburgh Plate would
have a contract action against the
employer if the latter's midterm modification was a lbreach of its agreement.
1

IMPORTANT OVERTONES

The overtones of Pittsburgh Plate
may be more important than its
stated themes. During its earlier
years, the so-called Kennedy-Johnson
Board reclassified a wholE! range of
managerial decisions as ·mandatory
subjects of bargaining.n In Fibreboard the Supreme 'Coutt sustained
the Board in ruling that an employer
had to bargain about the decision to
subcontract maintenance· work, at
least where the subcontractor's employees were going · to "perform the
satne task in the same plant under
the ultimate control of the same employer." 2 1 Thereafter, however, the
Board and some courts of appeals
divided over the criteria for determining mandatory ,subjects. The Boar<i
seemed to place primary emp~asls
on the employees' interest in avoiding
"impairment of job tenure, emplay.211 ]Ul,; Oonf. Bep. No. MO, 80th Oona.. 1st
Sella., p. 412 (1194'1).
·
,
26 See, e.g.; Town and Oomtry 11,Ug. Oo., 138
NiiB.B 1022, 49 LaBM 1918 (·1962), enforced.
316 P.2d 8418, 53 IJRB.M:. 2054 (5th Oir. 19113)
(teruunaittng a dei,e.rtment and aubconvaeting its wOll'k); · Oza.Tit Trailers, . Inc,. 181
NLB.'B •1•. 83 LRR.M 1284 (•1986) (clcaing one
planit of a multl!J)lant en.terp?iae),.,
·
ll7 PlbreboaNl Paper PNiduats Oor.p. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 20$, l!M, FIT.. IsaM 28(19 {,1984) (Stews
art, J .• concurring),
,
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ment security, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities." 2s The
courts, concerned about the employer's "freedom to manage its own affairs," placed the emphasis on whether there was "a change in basic operating procedure, ... a change in the
capital structure." 20 The Supreme
Court left this conflict unresolved.
More recently, the Labor Board has
apparently retreated from its former
position, joining the courts in stressing the employer's "freedom to manage" and viewing a "major change in
the nature of the ... business" as a
nonmandatory subject.so A sign that
the Supreme Court is now prepared
to adopt the Nixon Board's view may
be found in Justice Brennan's cryptic remark in Pittsburgh Plate: "This
is not to say that application of Oliver
and Fibreboard turns only on the impact of the third-party matter on employee interests. Other considerations,
such as the effect on the employer's
freedom to conduct his business, may
be equally important." 31
Pittsburgh Plate is also important
for its confirmation of the famous {or
infamous) mandatory-permissive dichotomy first approved by the supreme Court in the Borg-Warner
case.32 The notion th.at bargaining
topics should be classified into those
on which one party must bargain at
the behest of the other, under pain
of violating § 8{a) (5) · for a refusal,
and into those on which one party
cannot insist upon bargaining unless
the other agrees, under pain of violating 8(a) (5) for insisting, has been
much criticized by divers critics.as
The objections are various, and, in
my judgment, generally well-founded.
The mandatory-permissive categor•2s See,

e.g., Westinghouse

Electric Corp.,

150 N'LR'.B 1574, 58 IJRRM 1257 (.1965)

(BUb-

contraoting of both me.1ntenance and me.nufactur!ng operations).
'29 See, e.g., NlJRB v. Adams Dah-y, line., 350
F.2d 108, 60 LRR.M 2084 (8th Cir. 19185), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 101'1, 61, LB.RM 2192 ('1006)
(termination of d!Strlbution operations).
30 Summit Toollng Oo., 195 N1LRB No. 91
79 LR.RM 1396, 1'((10 (,1972).
'
31 404 U.S. at 179 n. 19, 78 LR.RM 2974.
32 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Wun.er
0o1'11)., 356 U.S. 342, 42 LRBM 2004 (11958)
33 See, e.g., Cox, "The Labor Decisions of
the Supreme Court a.t the Octiober Term
1957," !n AJ3A Section of La;1!pr l'telatlons
ILa.w__.1958 Proceedings 12, 30-40; Qhristenaen
"New Sub.fe~ts and New Concepts In Collec.:
tive Bargaining," in .ABA Bection at Labor Relations Law-1970 Proceedinp 245-252.

ization enables a fedeta,1,.,,administrative ·agency and ultimately the courts
to wield ·too much power.in determining what American employers and unions wm bargain about; it tends to
freeze collective bargaining,.; 1n outw'ol'Il- molds;· it establishes a· uniform
rule of law when the practices of different industries may call for quite
different treatment; and it leads to
duplicitous negotiations, as the parties create artificial deadlocks over
mandatory subjects in order to win
concessions on permissive subjects
they could not demarid directly. Moreover, it ignores the industrial reality
that economic strength, not legal
maneuvering, will eventually decide
the content of most labor agreements
anyway.
.
Any one of several possible alternatives would seem preferable to BorgWarner in my eyes. The mandatory.permissive distinction could be retained, but Borg-Warner overruled in
its holding that insistence on a permissive topic is equivale:nt to a refusal
to bargain. Under this approach, only
refusals to bargain· over. mandatory
subjects would violate § 8 (a) (5). Or all
subjects that any party wished to put
on the table {excluding, of course, unlawful proposals) could be considered
mandatory in the sense that the Labor Board would enforce the duty to
bargain about them. Or {and this last
is a suggestion I feel we may not be
able to evaluate properly without
more facts) all subjects would be considered mandatory, .but the NLRB
could withhold its processes in its discretion after a viable collective bargaining relationship was established.
The idea behind this last proposal is
that meaningful negotiations are
more often impeded than aided by the
parties' k n o w 1 e d g e that they can
make the filing of 8(a) (5) charges
part of their bargaining tactics.
One of the shrewdest management
attorneys I know thought that BorgWarner should have made the argumenlt that all lawful proposals
are mandatory bargaining subjects,
despite the obvious point that this
expansive reading of § 8(d) would on
its face seem to benefit unions more
than employers. My friend's position
was that the major problem for an
employer is not negotiating over an
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item the union wants to place on the
table; it is being caught· in the trap
of unilaterally changing something
the employer believed wasn't mandatory and subsequently learning from
the Labor Board that it was. This employer lawyer reasoned that over
time the general trend would be to
extend the scope of mandatory subjects, and thus he felt it was better
to end the uncertainty and the risk of
the unilateral action trap by making
everything mandatory once and for
all. "Then I'll know in advance exactly what I have to bargain about,"
he concluded, "and the outcome will
depend on negotiating skill and economic power, which is the way it
ought to be."
Another solution is suggested by
my learned friend and esteemed successor as Section Secretary, Dave Feller. He points out that the NLRB
hru:i assumed Without analysis that
the mandatory-permissive distinction
should apply in the same way in the
negotiating situation and in the unilateral action situation. At least one
other possibility ls thaJt all matters
any party wished to bring to the
table would have to be bargained
about, but since this concept could
indeed impede employer flexibility if
extended to unilateral action, employers would still be able to introduce changes with regard to certain
matters, akin to those now labeled
permissive, in the absence of a union
request for bargaining. I agree that
the Board's premise is an unexamined
one, and yet it seems to have been
confirmed without discussion in Pittsburgh Plate. In deciding ,that the employer did not violate § 8(a) (5) by
offering the retirees a substitute for
their benefits under the group health
plan, the Supreme Court apparently
accepted the notion of a parallelism
between the matters on which bargaining can be required and the matters which cannot be the subject of a
unilateral change. There was no
hint that the scope of mandatory bargaining might be different in the two
different contexts. The Court thus unfortunately continues its tradition of
inadequately reasoned law-making in.
the vital area of duty to bargain.
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IV. Central Hardware and
Union Access
The ancient conflict between an
employer's property rights and a union's right to proselytize came to the
fore again in the Central Hardware
case.s4 Central Hardware owned and
operated two retail stores in large
buildings surrounded on three sides
by parking lots. The parking lots were
maintained solely for the use of
Central's customers and employees.
There were other retail establishments with separate parking facilities· in the vicinity, but the various
stores were· not part of a shopping
center complex. A union began an organizational campaign at both of Central's stores. The campaign consisted
largely of the solicitation of Central's
employees by nonemployee union organizers on the employer's parking
lots. When Central had a union organizer arrested for violating a company no-solicitation rule, the union
filed unfair labor practice charges.
The NLRB and later a court of appeals ordered the employer to cease
enforcement of its no-solicitation
rule, on the ground the situation was
controlled by the Logan Valley Plaza
case.s5 In Logan Valley the Supreme
Court had held tl:iat a union's organizational picketing of a retailer in
a shopping center open to the public
was protected under the First Amendment. But in Central Hardware the
Supreme Court, per Justice Powell,
reversed and remanded, holding that
Logan Valley was inapplicable and
that the proper guide to decision was
NLRB v.. Babcock & Wilcox Co.SB
Babcock did not deal with constitutional rights but with the § 7 rights
of employees under the NLRA to carry
on organizational activities on an
employer's premises. It laid down the
rule that an employer ls entitled, as
master of his property, to exclude
nonemployee union organizers from
his premises as long as there are reaS(>nably available alternative means of
communicating with the employees.
The Court in Central Hardware there84 Central :Rarmvare Oo. v. Nllm, 407 U.S.
539, 912 S.Ot. 2238, BO umM 2'Nl9 (U.S. 1972).
85 1"ood Employees Local 5GO v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 68 LBRM 2209
(1968).
86 351 U.S. 105, 38 LB.RM 2001 (11956).
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fore sent the case back to the court of
appeals to consider the availabillty of
alternative channels of communica'tion.
,
Logan Valley is confined, said. the
Court, to those situations where .
private party has taken on certai,n
attributes of a public body. Generally, constitutional limitations apply
only to state action, or to equivalent
action by private persons. Examples
of the latter are the operation of a
"company town" 37 or, .as· in LQgan,
of a large commercial shopping cen;..
ter that has significantly displaced
the functions of the normal municipal
business block. It was thus .not enough
that Centriil's parking lots were "open
to the publlc" in· .the sense that customers as well as: employees could use
them. OtherWfs,e; as ·the. Court quite
aptly remarked, almost every retail
and service establishment in the
country would become sttbjel:lt to constitutional restrictions, and longsettled property rights would be infringed.
On their facts, Logan Valley Plaza
and Central Hardware are clearly distinguishable. Logan involved a shopping center.complex andCentra1 o:ply
parking .lots. At least f9r judge3, who
wish to sustain Logan Valley, Central Hardware presents . no barriers.
But signlflcantly Justice Marshall, the
author of .Logan, dissented in· Central
and was joined by Justices Douglas
and Brennan. Justiee Marshall agreed
with the majority that the ease should
have been considered first under
Babcock rather than under Logan. He
believed, however, that before the
Court decided whether the decision
below was corr.ect under the Constitution, it should have remanded to the
NLRB, rather than to the court of
appeals, for a . specific ruling on . the
applicabillty of Barbcock. Plainly, the
Court was not of one mind .in its
solicitude for the integrity of Logan.
Proper assessment of CentralHardware calls for examination of a companiQn case, Lloyd Corp. -v. Tanner,3s
involving non-,labor activity in a shopping center. Again speaking through
Justice Powell, the Court limited
Logan Valley by holding that the
~rst Amendment does not prevent a
37 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (11946).
38 92 5.0t. 2219 (U.S. 1972).

a

privately l>"~nea siiQ~. eeJJ,ter from
fornldding•": thiF distiiftmtJ.o:n. Qf .~tlvmi' Utetsi~ i~at t~ unr~alia t.o the
sfjGpping.' celi'lie~- operatllins/tit least
where· ~equate 'a1terna.th1~: means of
comnihnfoati'on ;.exM: Jilii\ices Marshall, Dougl~ Bre:rinari, and Stewart
dissented.
'
· · ·· ·
_· Lloyd Corp: is a, prime DJustration
of thl! venerable techi11que of balanclilg competing lhterests in the resolution of 'constitutional Issues. What
is: n~tewol'thy Js··;~e ~ e d
vttor with which ·J:ustiee ~11 asserts that pro~ tJgh~~;µ-e ·entitled
to ,a weight on tfte scales ~qmvalent to
that of speech rights: "[TJhe Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
private property owners, as well as
the Ji'irst Amen~nt rights of all
eit~~ns. must be. respeetecl .,$,Dd, protected/!.89 It is true that antiwar literature ~ay be said to ha;ve much
less "relation" than union nropaganda to th~, purposes for whieh a shopping center exists,. and thus .arguably
the, o:wner'.s propertV· ,righ. · are app,ropriAtely: immune to the burden of
the former but not of_ the .latter. In
thi~ way togan Valley and_ Lloyd
Corp. can logically.• stand · together.
~en so, in. llght of Justice Powell's
powerful, , statements on . behalf of
property rights in Lloyd, and in. light
of the dissent in that case by all four
of the -surviving members of. the Logan. maJority,49 . only the. hardiest
soul would claim that Lloyd leaves Logan's vitality unimpaired. My expectation is for the continuing limitation of Log:an Valley in the future.
Central Hardware and Lloyd Corp.
dealt with sollcitation and the distribution of literature, not with picketing; Logan Valley was a picketing
case. We therefore: can know nothing
explicit, although perhaps we can indulge in some surmise; ·about the attitude of the Lloyd majority toward
Logan's treatment of this · ambulatory· form of propaganda. A broad
dictum by Justice Marshall in Logan
Valley cut through the murk tha.t has
shrouded too many Supreme Court
opinions on this subject over the
years, and aroused hopes that the
89 fd. at 2229.
49 Justice White.1. the sole surviving dlsseDJter In Loga.n valley, WIIII Joined by an
four Nixon &.PJ>Olnteea to form 1.he maJorlty

111 Lloyd Oor,p.
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Court had at last devised a manage- Court continued to render the Corrupt
able test ·for the constitutional right Practices Act all but a dead letter
to picket. After making the obvious as applied to union political activity.
point that the· patrolllng element in According to Pipefitters Local 562 v.
picketing permits it to be regulated United States,43 18 U.S.C. § 610
as conduct as well as speech, Justice does not foz,bid contributions or exMarshall went on to stress the "pur- penditures from voluntarily financed
pose" of the picketing as the crucial union political funds. Reversing the
factor in determining whether it may convictions of a union and three of its
constitutionally be prohibited or re- officers, the Court declared:
stricted. The cases where bans on We hold that such a fund must be sepapicketing have been upheld, he rate from the .sponsoring union only in
stated, "involved picketing that was the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from union dues
found either to have been directed at . and
assessments. We hold, too, that, a.Ian illegal end . . . or to have been though solicitta.tion by unions o'fficials is
directed to coercing a decision by an permissible. such solicitation must be conunder circumstances plainly !Indiemployer which, although in itself ducted
cating that donatiOOlS are for a poliltical
legal, could validly be required by the purpose
and that those solicited may deState to be left to the employer's free cline to contribute without loss of job,
choice." u That test, of course, stlll union membership or any other reprisal
leaves hard questions to be. answered. within the union"S institutional power.44
But it has the great merit of focus- For the Court, the key to the ining attention, as in other free speech terpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 610 was
inquiries, on the content· of the mes- the belief that Congress intended
sage, and not the form it takes.42 I to ensure the voluntariness of unshould consider it regrettable if the ion members' contributions, and not
doubt cast by Lloyd on Logan Valley's otherwise to inhibit the exercise of
balancing of free speech and property union political power.
rights, when the location of the com- B. Nash-Finch and Preemption
municator ls the issue, should carry
Even in the absence of unfair laover (as it may very well) to Justice
Marshall's perceptive words on the bor practice chaz,ges before it, the
wholly dltferent issue of the constitu- NLRB may now seek federal injunctional status of picketing, regardless tive relief against preempted state
court action. In NURB v. Nash-Finch
of its location.
00.,45 the Supreme. Oourt sustained
the power of the Board to as·k a
V. Miscellany
federal court to enjoin a state court
Burns, Pittsburgh Plate, and Cen- injunction against peaceful pickettral Hard,ware bullt inueh the largest ing, despite the usual prohibitions of
amidst the Supreme Court's produc- 28 U.S.C. § 2283 against federal intion of laibor decisions during the past junctions to stay state court proceedterm. Nonetheless, there were eight ings, and despite the failure of the
other cases of varying degrees of im- company involved to file § 8(b) (4)
portance. To fulfill my reportorial or § 8(ib) (7) charges against the unmandate and make my acc01mting ion. Since the Board had no basis for
complete, I shall say a brief word. requesting a § l0(j) or § 10(1) inabout each of them.
junction, the express exception in
§ 2283 pennltting a federal court to
A. Pipefitters Local 562 and Political enjoin sta-t.e proceedings '"in aid of
Funds
its jurisdiction" was not appllcaible.
In a decision of special significance But in order "to prevent frustration
in an election year, the Supreme of the policies of the Act," the Board
was held to have "an implied author41 Food Bmployeea Local 590 v. Logan Vality," as a federal agency, "to enjoin
ley Plaza, Inc., 391 O.S. 308, 314 09168).
42 See a.lllo Jones, "Free Speech: Plckets state action where its federal power
on the Grass, Alasl-Amidat Contusion, A
preempts the field."
Oonslsten,t Prlncl1>le, 29 So. Oal. L. Rev. 13'1
157 ('1956): st. Antoine, "What Makes Secondary Boycott.& Seconde.ry?" In Southwestern LegaJ. Foundation, Labor Law DeveloPmen.ts-Proceedlngs of the Elevent.h Annual
Institute on Labor Le.w 5, 8-m (1'965).

411 407 0 .s. 385, lli2 Si.ot. 2247.. 80 LR.BM
2773 (0.8. 1972).
44 Id. e.t 2284, 80 IJll.RM 2773.
45 404 O.S. 138, 78 LRBM 2967 (19~1).
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The holding of Nash-Finch is note- were "parties to.· the dispute'~ witihin
worthy ib.ecause it gives the Labor the D).eanlng of the sectJ,pn. The
Board a powerful we·apon with which NLRB was therefore;, .emP9Wered to
to combat what had previously been determine the JurisdictJonal dispute
the practical omnipotence of certain under § lO(k) where only the unions,
injunction-wielding state trial judges. and not the Amnloyers, had agreed
But the implications of the decision upon a voluntary method· of adjustmay be even more noteworthy. For ment. The. unions ,were not allowed
the Burger Court, Nash-Finch re- to settle the matter between themflects an unwanted hospitableness selves, without employer participa.
.
toward the doctrine of federal pre- tion.
Another case where the surprises
emption. Only Justice White, in dissent was openly prepared to pursue (and the importance) would have
the notion es1)oused two years ago lain only in the decision's. g-Qing the
in Ariadne 46 that the only labor other way was NLRB v: Scrivener.111
activitity determined to be "actually, Eve:p. so, it was necessary t.o battle on
rather than arguably, protected un- up t.o the Supreme Court for a ruling
der fedel"lal law should be immune that an employer ,viplated § 8(a) (4)
from state judicial control." Perhaps by discharging. employees for glvmg
the challenge posed ,by Ariadne to written .sworn statements to a Boa.rd
Garmon 47 will subside, and Justice field examiner investigating unfair
Harlan's wise valedictory on preemp- labor practice e,har,ges against the
.~ployer, even though the employtion in Lockridge 48 will prevail.
ees had not, in the, literal language
C. Flair Builders and Arbitration
of the statute, CCfiled charges or given
Further evidence of the Supreme testimony" in a: formal hearing.
Court's· regard for the. arbitration E. One Each under the LMRDA:, Title
process ,was su1)plied by Operating
VII, and the RLA
Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders,
Rounding out this report are three
Inc. 4 9 The Court held that whether
a union grievance ls barred by procedural decisions, one each under
"!aches" is a question for the arbitra- Landrum-Griffin;· Title WI, and the
tor to decide under a broad aribitra- Railway 'I,a,bor \Act;
tion clause ap1)licable to "any differIn Trbovich v. UMW;112 the Suence" not settled by the parties with- preme Court held that a union memin 48 hours of the occurrence. This is ·ber who filed the initial election comtrue even if the claim of !aches is plaint ,with the Secretary of Labor
conside.red "extrinsic" to the arbitral may intervene in the Secretary's acprocedures under the agreement.
tion t.o set aside the election under
D. Plasterers and Scrivener: No Sur- Title IV of the LaJbor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act. Interprises
vention is confined, however, t.o the
A union's gallant if quixotic effort claims of illegality presented by the
to overturn twenty-five years of un- Secretary's complaint. While agreebroken Labor Board administrative ing that the Secretary's suit is the
practice crone finally to nought in exclusive remedy, the Court said:
Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRIB.5o Re- "There is no evidence whatever that
versing a court of appeal.s, the Su- Congress was opposed to participapreme Court held that employers tion by union members in the litigawith substanttal financial stakes in tion, so long as that participa-tion
the outcome of § 10 (k) proceedings did
not interfere wi•th the screening
and centralizing functions of the Sec46 Longshoremen's Lioca.1 1416 v. Arladne
retary." ~s
ShlPJ?ing Co., 397 U.S. 195, 202, 7:3 II.BRM 26215
(1970) (White, J., concurring),
The Court continued to clear the
47 San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 3159 U.S. 236, 43 lJRR,M 28Cl8 (1959)
path for civil rights claimants by
(esta.bllshtng the "argua•bly protected or ,probrushing aside procedural objections
ht.blted" test).
ba.sed on mere .technicalities. Under
48 Street, Elec. Ry. & '.Motor Ooaich Em-

ployees v. L<>ckrldge, 403 U .s. 274, 'l'7 uR.B;M
2501 (119'11) (reaffirming Garmon)'.
49 406 U.S. 487, 92 S.Ot. 1710, 80 LB.RM
2441 (U.S. 1972).
50404 U.S. 1'16, 78 L'.RRM 2897 (1971).

..:.£ 405
U.S. 1117,
(,U.S. 1972).

92

S.Ot. 798, 79 LB.RM

&JIC/fl

52 404 U.S. 528, 79 LBBIM 2193 (,1972).
53 rd. at 002-133, 79 IJRRM 2193.
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Tiflile VII Of the Civil Rights Act, a
state agency that is authorized to
deal with employment discrimination must be .given the oppor.tunity
to process a charge before i't is filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: charges must be
filed with the EEOC within a specified time following the commencement or te,rmination of the state proceedings, In Love v. !Pullman Co., 54
the Court ruled that the statutory
requirements ·were met if the EEOC,
upon receiving a complaint, orally
referred it to the appropriate state
agency, suspended action until the
state body could decide what to do,
and then treated the complMnt as
formally filed once the state agency
indicated it would not act. No further filing with the EEOC by the
aggrieved party was necessary.
Finally, the Supreme Cour.t laid an
old ghost to rest in Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R.55 In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,56 the
Court had held that ordinarily an
employee must exhaust the grievance
and artbitration procedures available
under a c.ollective bargaining agreement before he may resort to the
courts, specifically, in this instance,
for the enforcement of severance
claims. Maddox, decided under the
Taft-Hartley Act, left a• cloud over
Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.,57
which had ruled that an employee
did not have to exhaust his admini54 404 U.S. 522, 4 PEP 0 - 150 (1972).
55 406 U.S. 320 92 S.Ct. 1562, 80 I4tRIM
2240 (·U.5. 19'112).
·
56 379 U.S. 650, 58 LR.RM 2193 (19'615)
57 312 U.S. 630, 8 L1mM 455 (,1941).

strative remedies under the Railway
Labor Act before suing for wrongful
discharge. Andrews formally overruled Moore, thus aligning the TaftHartley and Railway Laibor Acts on
the exhaustion of remedies principle.
Consistency undoubtedly does not
rank high in today's hierarchy of
jurisprudential values, but it counts
for something, and we may as well
give some small thanks to see it manifested here.

VI. Conclusion
Sir Frederick Pollock once declared: "Caution and valour are both
needed for the fruitful constructive
interpretation of legal principles." 58
A few years ago, in assessing the
work of the Warren Court, I commented that many observers would
conclude that it was more conspicuous for "valour" than for "caution."
I added that if a choice had to be
made between the two, I thought "•valour" the more appropriate quality to
bring to the regulation of so dynamic
a field as labor relations. nie Burger
Court apparently feels otherwise. I
concede that it may :be too much to
ask of any single Court that it maintain an ideal !balance between boldness and circumspection, and that
su~cessive adjustments may be the
best we can hope for. After a decade
and a half of forays into new terrain
behind the clarion call of "valour,"
perhaps it is time for a bit of retrenchment under the more modest banner
of "caution."
1

·56 Pollock. "Judicial C'a.utlon and Valour,"
In Bar A.ss'n of the Olty of New York, ed.,
Jurisprudence In Ac,tion 367, 373 (1953).

ABA'S SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
NLRB Chairman on Admfo.istrative Law Judges
The following is the full text of an
address delivered by NLRB Chairman
Edward B. Miller on August 12, 1972,
in San Francisco at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association,
Section of Judicial Adminisitra;tion.

[ have chosen as the iflitle of :these
remarks, "The AdministraJtive Law
Judge--Who, Where, How, . Wlhen?"

Wha-t I -would like :to explore I\V'lth
you for a :few minutes, under the lbasie !headings suggested by thait tiltle,
might lbe rephrased as, "Wha.t are
you going t;o lbe, now that you've
grown up?" ··
The change 1n tttle from Hearing
Examiner to Administrative Law
Judge indicaites that ,there has now

